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We investigate the possibility that new facilities aﬀect attendance - the “novelty eﬀect” -
in professional baseball, basketball, and football from 1969-2001 by estimating the parameters
of a reduced form attendance model. Our results indicate a strong, persistent novelty eﬀect
in baseball and basketball and little or no novelty eﬀect in football. Our estimates of size and
duration of the novelty eﬀect imply that, in a new facility, at a minimum, a baseball team would
sell an additional 2,561,702 tickets over the ﬁrst eight seasons, a basketball team 446,936 over
the ﬁrst nine seasons, and a football team 163,436 over the ﬁrst ﬁve seasons. This increase
in attendance also suggests a corresponding increase in revenues that could be tapped to help
defray the large public subsidies that state and local governments frequently provide to new
stadium and arena construction projects.
JEL Codes: L83, R39, D12
I. Introduction
Both conventional wisdom and casual empiricism suggest that new sports facilities boost attendance
at sporting events. Economists, when analyzing the economic impact of professional sports teams
and facilities on local economies, also typically assume that these eﬀects are concentrated in the
years immediately following the opening. Some evidence of a relatively large “novelty eﬀect” on
attendance exists. Quirk and Fort (1997) report an average increase in attendance of about 62%
during the ﬁrst ﬁve years a baseball team plays in a new stadium. But based on attendance at
several new baseball stadiums, where attendance is down signiﬁcantly, the era of large novelty
eﬀects on attendance may be ending. Whether this decline can be attributed to macroeconomic
events outside the control of sports teams or to the glut of new stadiums opened in the last decade is
an open question. In order to address these issues, several fundamental questions must be answered
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1about the “novelty eﬀect” of new facilities on attendance, including how this eﬀect varies over time
and between sports. In this paper, we investigate the size and dynamic behavior of the eﬀect of a
new sports facility on annual average live game attendance in professional football, basketball, and
baseball.
This research examines attendance in a number of professional sports leagues. Quirk and Fort
(1997) documented large increases in average attendance following the opening of new baseball
stadiums. They claim that similar increases may not exist in professional basketball and football
because the large number of sold out regular season games leaves little leeway for dramatic increases
in attendance after a new facility opens in these sports, although Quirk and Fort point out that
the proﬁts of franchises in these other sports may be enhanced by opening a new facility, largely
through higher prices for tickets. Sold out games occur infrequently in regular season baseball
games. Noll (1974) reported that the eﬀects of the age of a baseball stadium show “a steady,
linear decline in the attendance generated by a new stadium” and that this “proved much more
signiﬁcant than alternatives, such as dummy variables for ’very new’ and ’middle-aged’ stadiums.”
Noll’s regressions explaining attendance at basketball, football and hockey games do not include
terms capturing the novelty eﬀect. We analyze attendance at professional football, basketball and
baseball games to assess the validity of these predictions.
The eﬀect of a new stadium or arena on attendance at professional sporting events also has
important public policy implications. Nearly all new professional sports facilities built in the US in
the past forty years received large public subsidies. The public supports construction of stadiums
through the issue of bonds with a maturity of many years. State and local governments subsidize
sports facility construction and pay oﬀ the bonds that ﬁnance this construction, so information
about the size and duration of the novelty eﬀect can help decision makers to formulate appropriate
policies. For example, using the increased public revenues from these stadiums to cover the principal
and interest on government bonds issued to ﬁnance stadium construction until their maturity would
be in the public interest. To know if this is possible, one needs an estimate of how long the boost
to attendance and, therefore, revenues, from the new facilities lasts and how large the boost might
be.
The length of the novelty eﬀect also plays an important role in studies of the economic impact
of professional sports teams and facilities on local economies. Empirical research in this area makes
a distinction between new sports facilities - those open between ﬁve and eleven seasons - and
existing facilities. For example, Baade and Sanderson (1997), citing Noll, suggest that the novelty
eﬀect of new sports facilities disappears 7 to 11 years after opening in their study of the eﬀects of
sports facilities on employment. Coates and Humphreys (1999, 2001, 2003) use a dummy variable
indicating the ﬁrst ten years a sports facility is open regardless of the sport or sports the facility
houses, implicitly assuming that the novelty eﬀect is of equal duration and size regardless of the
sport for which a facility is constructed or the amount of time that has passed since the facility
opened. Any economic impact generated by new sports facility construction may be masked by
misspeciﬁcation in the estimating equations used in these studies. This research assesses the validity
of this assumption.
Most studies of the determinants of attendance at professional sporting events typically assume
equal size and duration of the novelty eﬀect. Bruggink and Eaton (1996) modeled the eﬀect of
stadium age on baseball attendance using the age of the stadium in years and found negative
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of stadium age for American League franchises, but positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀects of age in the National League. They suggest the diﬀerence may be related
to vastly diﬀerent stadium ages between the two leagues. Three American League facilities were
under four years old but the youngest National League stadium was 6 years old, followed by the
next youngest at 22 years old. Coﬃn (1996) modeled the novelty eﬀect in baseball stadiums as
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and Shmanske (1997) modelled the novelty eﬀect as constant over three years and found positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀects of new stadiums on annual attendance in professional baseball during the
period 1990-1992. Harrison and Coates (2002) estimate demand functions for major league baseball
attendance that allow the natural logarithm of the age of the stadium to aﬀect attendance. None
of these studies examined the size and dynamic behavior of the novelty eﬀect on attendance for
all three major professional sports or in all types of facilities. We attempt to ﬁll this void in the
literature.
It appears, at least in baseball, that the novelty eﬀect of a new stadium now has a much
shorter duration than in the past. For example, in Pittsburgh, where PNC Park opened in 2001,
attendance was down about 26.8% in the 2002 season from the 2001 level, almost back to its level
from the last season in Three Rivers Stadium in 2000, and after 51 home dates in the 2003 season
continued to decline another 9% from the 2002 season. In Detroit, where Comerica Park opened
in April 2000, attendance was down 21.7% in 2002 relative to 2001, which was lower than the 2000
level, and even below the level for 1999, the last in Tiger Stadium.After 49 home dates in the 2003
season attendance continued to decline by another 9% from the 2002 season. In Milwaukee, where
Miller Park opened in April 2001, generating a boost to Brewers’ attendance of 1.23 million over
the 2000 season, attendance was down by 30% in 2002 relative to 2001, and after 54 home dates
in 2003 continued to decline by 22% from the 2002 season. Admittedly, the national economy has
been in, or sluggishly emerging from, a recession for the past few years, and the threat of a work
stoppage hung over much of the 2002 season. However, attendance was only down 6.2% across all
of Major League Baseball in 2002 and several teams experienced attendance growth.1 The Sports
Business Journal highlighted these eﬀects in an article by Frederick C. Klein (2002), suggesting
that there has been a decline in the novelty eﬀects of stadiums and that the decline has been worse
for stadiums and arenas that are not placed “in a lively neighborhood, where people are happy to
gather even on non-game days.”
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe a reduced
form empirical model of live game attendance at sporting events that captures the novelty eﬀect of
new facilities. Rather than force the data into a path of our choosing, estimation of the parameters
of this model allows the data to tell us the time-path of the novelty eﬀect. Succeeding sections
describe the data used in the analysis, report and discuss the results, and draw some conclusions
from these results.
II. An Attendance Model
In this section we describe a reduced form empirical model of live game attendance at sporting
events. Before specifying this reduced form model, we consider the economic theory underlying the
model. We intend to explain average attendance at professional sporting events. Attendance is the
result of the interaction of the demand for attending games in person and the supply of seats in
sports facilities.
To illustrate this point, consider the following simple supply and demand model for attendance
where Qd is quantity of tickets demanded, Qs is quantity of tickets supplied, and P is the ticket
price. The demand function is
1Figures reported in the text for the 2003 season come from http://www.canoe.ca/Baseball/attendance.html,
accessed on July 25, 2003. Figures for the 2002 season and declines from the 2001 season were taken from The Sports
Business Journal, “By The Numbers”, Vol. 5, Issue 36.
3Qd = α + βP + γ1D1 + γ2D2 + γ3D3 (1)
where the Djs are demand shifters - dummy variables indicating the stadium is in its jth year
of operation - that capture the novelty eﬀect in this model. In this way, we assume that the
novelty eﬀect works through consumers’ preferences or tastes for attendance at sporting events. β
is the eﬀect of price on the quantity demanded and α an intercept parameter. For computational
convenience, we assume that the novelty eﬀect lasts three seasons in this example. The supply
function is
Qs = λP (2)
where λ is the eﬀective of price on quantity supplied. The supply function is assumed to have unit
price elasticity everywhere, without loss of generality. The equilibrium condition in this market is
Qd = Qs, and a reduced form equation for attendance can be found using this condition. Invert
the supply function and substitute the result into the demand equation. Using the equilibrium









Q = a + c1D1 + c2D2 + c3D3
can be derived after a bit of manipulation. In the second line, c1, c2 and c3 are reduced form
parameters that reﬂect both the novelty eﬀects and the relative price elasticities from the supply and
demand functions. These reduced form parameters are the product of the novelty eﬀect parameters
γi and λ
λ−β = s
s+d, where the j are the price elasticities of the demand and supply functions. The
latter term falls in the range 0 to 1, implying that ci is a lower bound on γi, the structural novelty
eﬀect of interest. This equation for attendance forms the basis for our empirical investigation of




ckDk + θW +  (3)
that includes W, a vector of control variables that shift either the demand or supply function. K
is the number of seasons over which the novelty eﬀect persists and  an unobservable error term.
For our purposes, the γs are the parameters of interest, as they capture the novelty eﬀect
on demand for tickets to sporting events. Coﬃn (1996) and Harrison and Coates (2002) both
investigate the novelty eﬀect on attendance by explicitly estimating a demand function, like equation
(1), for baseball games over a short period for which baseball ticket price data exist. Although
ticket price data are sporadically available for baseball over our longer sample period, ticket price
data are not available for professional football or professional basketball by team over much of the
period. We lack the price data required to estimate a demand function containing novelty eﬀect
terms but can learn something about the novelty eﬀect using the relationship between the reduced
form parameters and the structural parameters of the demand and supply functions. In particular,
the ratio of any two of the reduced form parameters on Dk equals the ratio of the structural










c1 > 1 then the novelty eﬀect of a new facility rises in the second season relative to the ﬁrst season.
If the sign is reversed, the novelty declines from the ﬁrst to the second season. Our expectation is
that the cis are each positive, though they approach zero over time.
The speciﬁc linear reduced form model of attendance at sporting events we estimate
ATTit = aXit + bZit +
K X
k=1
ckDkit + eit (4)
relates ATTit, average attendance at games in city i in year t to Xit, a vector of demographic and
economic control variables for the city and year, Zit, a vector of franchise and stadium characteristics
including the age of the facility in years, and Dkit, a dummy variable that takes on a value of one
if the stadium in city i and year t is in its kth year of operation. Vectors a and b, and the cks, are
all reduced form parameters, functions of the underlying structural parameters of the demand and
supply functions as described in the model above. eit is an unobservable equation error term that
captures the eﬀects of all other factors on average attendance at sporting events. We assume that
the error term takes the form
eit = vi + mt + uit. (5)
where uit ∼ (0,σ2
u). This assumption means that there is some city or franchise speciﬁc component
that is constant over time, a year speciﬁc component that is constant across franchises and cities
in each year, and a well behaved random component that varies by franchise or city and year. The
city and year speciﬁc components of the error term can be estimated as a series of dummy variables
in a two-way ﬁxed eﬀects model.
In this context, the vectors of explanatory variables Xit and Zit contain variables that shift the
demand and supply curves for attendance at professional sporting events in cities; some of these
variables may shift both. Although we focus on estimating the novelty eﬀect of new facilities on
attendance, we still must control for variation in other factors that aﬀect attendance.
Successful teams are likely to have higher attendance than unsuccessful teams. In our analysis,
we use the won-loss percentage in the current year in one speciﬁcation, the won-loss percentage in
the previous year in another, and playoﬀ participation from the previous year in both to control
for team success. Our hypothesis is that a greater won-loss percentage raises attendance, as does
participation in the previous season’s playoﬀs.
Additional sports related variables that might explain attendance include stadium capacity,
the total number of professional sports franchises in a city, and the number of games in a season.
Stadium capacity is assumed to have an impact on attendance. Obviously, at one extreme atten-
dance is limited by the number of seats in the venue. However, number of seats is only a binding
consideration if the stadium is sold out. Consequently, the marginal impact of capacity must vary
with capacity. It may even turn negative as a large stadium with room for more fans may also
mean greater distance from the ﬁeld and less visibility of the action.
The number of sports franchises in a city reﬂects the scope of alternative sporting events avail-
able to residents of the city, as well as visitors. Many of the cities in our sample have a franchise
in more than one of the three sports, and Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles have multiple
franchises in a single sport. The availability of these alternative major league sport entertainment
opportunities may aﬀect the attendance at the diﬀerent franchises and, more importantly for our
purposes, the novelty eﬀect, from opening new facilities. For example, suppose a franchise opens a
new football stadium during the heat of a pennant race involving that city’s baseball team. One
can imagine that might reduce the interest in attending football, reducing the novelty impact of the
stadium. To capture the presence of these alternative sports we include a variable that counts the
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this variable and attendance cannot be signed with certainty a priori because alternative sporting
events may be either substitutes or complements, but our intuition is that more sports franchises
in a city will tend to lower the average attendance for a speciﬁc franchise.
The number of games in a season may also aﬀect average attendance. Professional baseball
teams play 81 regular season home games, football changed from 14 to 16 regular season home
games beginning with the 1978 season, and basketball teams play 41 home games. The football
season runs from September through January, or ﬁve months, while the baseball season runs from
April until October, more than 6 months, and the basketball regular season runs from late October
through mid-April. The lengths of the seasons, the relative scarcity of home football games, the fact
that nearly all football games are played on Sunday afternoons while baseball and basketball games
are played throughout the week and generally in the evening, suggests that intensity of demand for
attendance at the three types of sporting events may diﬀer. These vast diﬀerences in schedules and
the generally much larger attendance at NFL games suggests that equations for novelty eﬀects of
new facilities must be estimated for each sport. We also use average attendance as our dependent
variable rather than total attendance to control for the eﬀects of diﬀerences in schedules.
Demographic and economic controls in our reduced form equation are per capita income, pop-
ulation and city and year-speciﬁc dummy variables. We hypothesize that greater income in the
community will raise attendance and that having a larger fan base to draw from, a larger popu-
lation, will have the same eﬀect. City speciﬁc dummy variables control for any local factors not
already accounted for, such as climate, ease of obtaining tickets, and parking and other monetary
and non-monetary costs of attendance at sporting events in the city.
III. Data Description
The data used in this analysis form a panel of annual average attendance at Major League Baseball
(MLB), National Football League (NFL) and National Basketball Association (NBA) games in each
U.S. city that hosted a franchise in one of those sports, along with additional franchise-speciﬁc and
city-speciﬁc data, over the period 1969 to 2001. The panel includes data for franchises that existed
in cities throughout the sample period as well as expansion franchises and teams that relocated
during the sample period, but excludes franchises in Canadian cities due to a lack of city-speciﬁc
economic and demographic data.
Studies of attendance at sporting events typically use annual attendance for an entire sports
league (see Schmidt and Berri (2002) for a recent example), annual attendance for individual teams
(see Humphreys (2002) and Eckard (2001) for recent examples), or attendance at individual games
(see Garcia and Rodriguez (2002) and Price and Sen (2003) for recent examples). We use annual
average attendance for teams in professional sports leagues as the unit of observation. Total annual
league attendance would obscure the eﬀects of a single new facility. Game speciﬁc attendance
data are not available over a long period of time in the three professional sports we examine and
we lack economic and demographic control variables at this frequency. Our unit of observation,
average annual attendance for an individual franchise, should capture the eﬀects of individual sports
facilities and corresponds in frequency and geographical area with economic and demographic data
available for Standard Statistical Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) data available as part of
the Regional Economic Information System data published by the Department of Commerce.
Table 1 shows sample statistics for the key variables in the empirical model for the three
professional sports. As expected based on facility size, football franchises have the largest average
attendance, followed by baseball and then basketball. Baseball franchises tend to be located in
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much smaller than any other city hosting a professional sports franchise - and baseball stadiums
and franchises are older than those in football and basketball. Also as expected, many more
basketball teams reach the postseason than in football, and relatively few baseball franchises reach
the postseason.
Our sample period has been an active one in the construction of stadiums and arenas, and in
the creation of new franchises. For example, during the 1990s alone the four major professional
sports, baseball, football, basketball, and hockey, experienced growth of 19 expansion franchises
and construction of 55 new stadiums or arenas. Major League Baseball has seen four new franchises
and 14 new stadiums since 1990; the NFL expanded by adding franchises, in Charlotte, Jacksonville
and Cleveland, and saw four franchises relocate from one city to another (Browns from Cleveland
to Baltimore where they became the Ravens, Oilers from Houston to Nashville where they became
the (Tennessee) Titans, Rams from Los Angeles to St. Louis, and Raiders from Los Angeles to
Oakland) and 15 new stadiums. Baltimore lured the existing franchise away from Cleveland in
1995, with play beginning in Baltimore in 1996. Cleveland launched a successful campaign to
recover a team and to keep the colors and name of the departed franchise. From the last two lines
of Table 1, between 2.7% and 6.6% of the franchise seasons in the sample were the ﬁrst season in
a new facility and between 27% and 58% of the franchise seasons in the sample were within ten
seasons of the opening of a new facility. There were more new facilities opened during the sample
period in basketball than in the other two sports.
The empirical analysis controls for variation in factors like team loyalty in assessing the novelty
eﬀects of the new stadium. Teams that have existed in a particular city for longer periods of time
will develop both a broader and a deeper following among local fans. This greater attachment,
or the “fan loyalty eﬀect,” may result in greater attendance at games, other things equal. Our
approach to measuring this loyalty to the team is to include as a regressor the age of the franchise.
For many franchises this is quite simple. For example, the Boston Red Sox and the New York
Yankees have played since the early years of the 20th century in the same city. Their ages date
from that time. Franchises like the Baltimore Orioles, the San Francisco Giants and the Los Angeles
Dodgers existed in other cities prior to becoming the teams that are familiar now. The Giants and
the Dodgers both moved from New York in 1958, keeping their names and colors. The Orioles
moved from St. Louis, where they were the Browns, in 1954. The ages of these franchises for the
purposes of our analysis date from their inaugural seasons in their current home cities. That is the
approach we take in each case. However, there are some complications.
In the NFL, the problem is that there are two unprecedented events that complicate franchise
dating. First, the Raiders franchise left Oakland in 1982 for Los Angeles and then left Los Angeles
in 1994 to return to Oakland. Through these moves they retained the team nickname, logo, and
colors. The franchise returned to the same stadium in Oakland that it had left 12 years before. Our
approach is to treat the Raiders as three distinct franchises, one born in 1961 that died in 1982,
one born in 1982 that died in 1994, and a third that was born in 1994. Whether such an approach
captures the build-up of fan loyalty over time that we proxy for with franchise age is questionable.
The case of the Cleveland Browns highlights this uncertainty.
In 1995, the then Cleveland Browns relocated to Baltimore. Residents of Cleveland had histori-
cally supported this franchise with high attendance despite a creaky old stadium and many seasons
of lackluster play. The fans in Cleveland were rightfully upset, and elicited great sympathy from
around the country, for the way their city had been abandoned. Interestingly, no similar outpouring
of sympathy for Baltimore arose when its team, the Colts, moved to Indianapolis in 1984, for Oak-
land when the Raiders moved to Los Angeles in 1982, or for St. Louis when the Cardinals left for
Arizona. A few months after the move, the NFL promised the city a new franchise and the owner of
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MLB NFL NBA
Variable N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D.
Average Attendance Per Game 809 22,780 9,464 927 57,394 11885 771 13,456 4366
Real Per Capita Personal Income 809 15,888 3027 927 15,428 3073 771 15,560 2819
Population (000) 809 3,731 2,477 927 3,144 2,323 771 3,360 2,481
Winning Percentage 809 .500 .069 927 0.500 0.197 771 0.500 0 .151
Stadium Age 809 29 23 927 24 17 771 16 14
Team Age 809 47 34 927 31 19 771 25 14
Playoﬀ Appearance Last Year 780 0.18 0.39 891 0.29 0.45 736 0.58 .49
First 10 years in Stadium 809 0.272 .445 927 0.376 .484 771 0.578 .494
First Year in Stadium 809 0.027 .163 927 0.046 .210 771 .066 .249
the Browns, Art Model, relinquished the team name and colors to the city. Consequently, while no
team played in Cleveland from 1996 until 1999, three seasons, there is some very real sense in which
the franchise is the same. Indeed, if one looks at the Cleveland Browns history on the NFL.com
website, the records and accomplishments of the pre-move Browns are chronicled with those of the
new incarnation of the Browns, albeit with a three year gap. (By contrast, the accomplishments of
the Baltimore Colts are displayed on the Indianapolis Colts web page despite the fact that none of
the Hall of Fame Colts ever played or coached in Indianapolis and that the team was in Baltimore
when it won each of its 3 NFL championships.) The Browns and Raiders situations complicate the
franchise age issue. Nonetheless, as a ﬁrst approximation we simply measure age from the arrival
of a franchise into a city.
Finally, the model described above includes both year and franchise speciﬁc eﬀects. The year
speciﬁc eﬀects may capture national economic circumstances, a compelling pennant race or the
eﬀects of a player chasing some record. For example, one might think that attendance in baseball
was higher than usual throughout the National League in 1998 when Mark McGwire and Sammy
Sosa were chasing, and breaking, the single season home run record. The year speciﬁc eﬀects will
capture some of these and myriad other year to year variations which are common across professional
sports and cities. The franchise speciﬁc eﬀects will capture aspects of the local community that are
consistent across time yet not captured by other factors. Possible eﬀects captured by the franchise
speciﬁc eﬀects are the climate or region, the nature of the city (industrial versus commercial, e.g.),
or the “sports culture” of the community.
In terms of capturing the novelty eﬀect, we use two distinct variables in the analysis. First, we
include the age of the stadium in a given year. Second, we have dummy variables that indicate
the ﬁrst through tenth year in a new stadium or a variable that indicates that the current year is
one of the ﬁrst ten. This latter variable is akin to the approach taken by Coates and Humphreys
(1999, 2001, 2003). We have included the age of the stadium to account for detrimental eﬀects
on attendance associated with run down or decrepit facilities with poor amenities. Clearly, older
stadiums were designed with less consideration given to fan comfort and environment than the
newer ball parks of the last decade. The condition of the older stadiums is often one of the issues
raised by owners who hint at moving their franchise if a new stadium is not built. At the same
time, we are interested in those eﬀects on attendance associated with the novelty of the stadium.
These eﬀects would appear above and beyond those of the age of the facility. Consequently, we
include the variables picking out each of the ﬁrst ten years a stadium is open. Descriptive statistics
for the variables, except the dummies for year of operation, are provided in Table 1.
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Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation (4) with the OLS estimator under the assumption
that current real per capita income in each city and the current winning percentage of each franchise
are uncorrelated with the equation error term. Recall that the attendance model is a reduced form
equation and the parameters of this model reﬂect both demand shifts and supply shifts, complicating
the interpretation of the coeﬃcients.
The duration of the novelty eﬀect will be reﬂected in patterns in the cks and in the size of
K. Because the appropriate number of Dk terms to include may vary by sport, we estimate the
reduced form attendance model separately for each sport. In keeping with the standard practice
in the literature, we chose 10 seasons as the base case in our empirical analysis.
The results for the columns headed with (1) use a dummy variable that is equal to 1 in each
of the ﬁrst ten seasons played in a new stadium or arena as a proxy for the novelty eﬀect and the
results in the columns headed with (2) use ten separate dummy variables to capture the novelty
eﬀect. The parameter estimates on the city and franchise speciﬁc variables are not sensitive to the
choice of a proxy variable for the novelty eﬀect. There is a good deal of variation in the parameter
estimates across the three professional sports.
The parameter estimates on the city and franchise speciﬁc variables are, in general, statistically
signiﬁcant and correctly signed. Variation in per capita income is positively associated with vari-
ation in average attendance in MLB and the NFL, although the signiﬁcance of the parameters in
the NFL is weak. Variation in per capita income is not statistically related to variation in average
attendance in the NBA. There is no evidence of market size eﬀects for MLB and NFL franchises;
variation in the population of the city hosting MLB and NFL franchises does not explain variation
in average attendance. Curiously, there is evidence of a negative market size eﬀect in the NBA,
where franchises in larger cities tend to average fewer fans per game than franchises in smaller
cities.
Success on the ﬁeld or court is associated with higher attendance; the parameters on the cur-
rent winning percentage variables are uniformly positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The size of
this parameter is somewhat diﬃcult to interpret because the values taken on by the explanatory
variable are fractions between zero and one. At the means of the variables, the elasticity of average
attendance with respect to changes in winning percentage implied by these point estimates are 1.06
in MLB, 0.14 in the NFL, and 0.29 in the NBA. These elasticities are consistent with the idea that
the walk-up gate, which should be related to on-ﬁeld success, is more important in baseball than
in basketball or football. The parameters on the lagged playoﬀ appearance variables are positive
and statistically signiﬁcant in the NFL and MLB but not in the NBA, perhaps due to the smaller
number of teams that make the postseason in MLB and the NFL relative to the NBA, where most
teams make the postseason.
We use both facility age and the number of years a franchise has played in a city as explanatory
variables. Theory provides no guidance on the appropriate functional form for these variables, so
we investigated alternative speciﬁcations: a linear speciﬁcation, a linear-quadratic speciﬁcation,
and a semi-log speciﬁcation. We report only the linear and linear-quadratic speciﬁcation results
because the semi-log results are essentially the same as the linear-quadratic ones, though with
somewhat larger novelty eﬀects. These results are available upon request. We found diﬀerences
between attendance in MLB and the NFL and NBA in terms of nonlinearities in the stadium age
and team trend variables. F-tests suggest that the eﬀects of stadium age and franchise tenure in
the NFL and NBA are linear, but these eﬀects are nonlinear in MLB. These F-tests suggest that
squared terms on stadium age and the team trend variable belong in the attendance model for
MLB only.
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draw fewer fans than teams in newer facilities, a claim made frequently by franchises in search of
public funding for a new stadium, at least up to a point. Each additional year a team plays in an
existing stadium reduces average attendance by 71-91 per game in a baseball stadium, by 134-145
per game in a football stadium and by 78-82 per game in a basketball arena. This range comes from
evaluating the derivative of the relationship with respect to stadium age at the average stadium
age in the sample. At the average age of facilities in each sport this suggests that the total eﬀect
of stadium age is to reduce attendance by about 35 per game in MLB, 3,500 per game in the NFL,
and 1,300 in the NBA. But the novelty eﬀects discussed below suggest that the impact of a new
stadium on attendance will be larger than just from replacing an average aged facility.
Interestingly, the stadium age eﬀect in MLB increases with age, rising from -150 at opening,
not including the novelty eﬀects discussed below, reaching zero at about 74 years, and becoming
positive thereafter. In other words, at about 74 years, a baseball stadium changes from an “aging
eyesore” in need of replacement into an “historic treasure” to the community. The status given to
old baseball parks like Fenway Park in Boston, Wrigley Field in Chicago, and Yankee Stadium in
New York motivate the size and sign of these variables.
The parameters on the team trend variable are a mixed bag, perhaps because this variable is a
poor proxy for fan loyalty and does not adequately capture the eﬀects of fan loyalty on attendance.
The point estimates on this variable are not statistically diﬀerent from zero in the NFL. It is positive
and signiﬁcant in MLB, suggesting that the fan loyalty eﬀect on attendance is positive. But the
parameters are negative and signiﬁcant in the NBA, suggesting that the longer an NBA franchise
stays in a city, the lower its average attendance. This negative fan loyalty eﬀect may explain
why NBA franchises move much more often than NFL or MLB franchises, but the underlying
preferences and consumer behavior of fans are unclear. The negative squared term on the team
trend variable in MLB suggests that the positive eﬀect of fan loyalty on average attendance is
increasing at a decreasing rate in that sport and becomes negative at an age of 40 years. This
eﬀect is not intuitive so we also estimated the model using the log of team trend rather than the
linear-quadratic speciﬁcation. The results on the variables of interest, the novelty eﬀects, were
somewhat larger and followed the same pattern as described below. The log team trend variable
was positive and statistically signiﬁcant. These results are available upon request.
We also control for the relationship between the number of other professional sports teams in
a city and average attendance at games in each sport. The variable “# Other Franchises ” is
the number of other professional teams in each city. This variable reﬂects the scope of alternative
sporting events attendees have to choose from in each city in the sample in each year. The point
estimates on this variable are statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level only in MLB, although
the P-values indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level in the NBA. The signs of these variables sug-
gest that other sports are substitutes for professional baseball and, to a lesser extent, professional
basketball in cities. Each additional competing professional sports franchise reduces average at-
tendance at MLB games by about 1,800. The parameter on a variable containing the capacity of
each sports facility was not statistically diﬀerent from zero in any of the models, so we dropped
this variable from the model.
The ﬁnal set of explanatory variables capture the novelty eﬀects of new facilities. Model (1)
uses a dummy variable for the ﬁrst ten seasons in a new facility, a speciﬁcation consistent with the
general practice in the literature. The parameter on this variable is positive and signiﬁcant in all
three professional sports, suggesting that new sports facilities increase attendance holding constant
on-ﬁeld success, market size, and other factors. The novelty eﬀect is largest in MLB, an increase
in average attendance of about 11% per year in each season over the 10 season period, somewhat
smaller in the NFL, an 8% increase, and smallest in the NBA, about a 4% increase. However,
10Table 2: Attendance Model - Wins and Income Exogenous
Dependent Variable: Average Attendance
MLB NFL NBA
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Per Capita Income 1.001 0.978 0.722 0.676 -0.096 -0.115
0.000 0.000 0.062 0.080 0.392 0.309
Population -0.0003 -0.0005 0.001 0.001 -0.0001 -0.0001
0.710 0.527 0.356 0.316 0.540 0.416
Current Winning % 47819 48068 17478 17861 9120 9128
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Stadium Age -150 -106 -145 -134 -82 -78




Team Trend 120 118 337 313 -88 -90




# Other Franchises -1864 -1774 193 282 -386 -387
0.000 0.000 0.831 0.757 0.087 0.087
Playoﬀs−1 4341 4398 1742 1791 297 306
0.000 0.000 0.014 0.012 0.093 0.086
First 10 Years 2400 2484 1080
0.001 0.003 0.000
First Year 5543 2916 1180
0.001 0.087 0.013
Second Year 4940 4613 1262
0.000 0.005 0.001
Third Year 2841 3805 1404
0.028 0.029 0.000
Fourth Year 3455 1646 1510
0.004 0.337 0.000
Fifth Year 2801 5329 1378
0.021 0.001 0.000
Sixth Year 2298 1650 1090
0.051 0.322 0.005
Seventh Year 2660 4299 854
0.022 0.010 0.028
Eighth Year 2455 1570 833
0.032 0.349 0.034
Ninth Year 1813 2033 1069
0.104 0.229 0.008
Tenth Year 2046 -880 749
0.062 0.594 0.066
Observations 780 780 891 891 736 736
R
2 0.80 0.80 0.53 0.54 0.80 0.80
P-values Shown Below Parameters
11this speciﬁcation forces an equal novelty impact on attendance in each season during the ten year
period and may not capture the dynamics of the novelty eﬀect.
The second speciﬁcation uses a separate dummy variable for each season in the ﬁrst ten after
a new facility opens. Based on these results, the ten year dummy variable does not capture the
dynamics of the novelty eﬀect of a new facility on attendance. In MLB, the ﬁrst eight year dummy
variables are positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level and a declining pattern can be seen in these
parameters. The novelty eﬀect in baseball is persistent and declines gradually. The novelty eﬀect
is also persistent in the NBA, where a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect - based on a 5% level of
signiﬁcance - on attendance can be seen in each of the ﬁrst nine seasons played in a new arena. No
clear pattern emerges in the NFL, where a scattering of parameters are positive and signiﬁcant,
including seasons two, three, ﬁve and seven. The novelty eﬀect may be absent in the NFL because
of diﬀerences in the number of home games per season - 8 in the NFL compared to 81 in MLB and
41 in the NBA - and because football stadiums are larger and on average ﬁlled closer to capacity
than baseball and basketball facilities.
Overall, the attendance models explain less of the observed variation in attendance at NFL
games than NBA and MLB games. The reduced form attendance model explains 80% of the
observed variation in attendance at MLB and NBA games, compared to just over half the observed
variation in attendance at NFL games. This may be due to the lack of a detectable novelty eﬀect
associated with new NFL stadiums.
Again, the contemporaneous per capita income and winning percentage variables in these six
models may be correlated with the unobservable equation error terms. If such correlation exists,
then the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent, and the point estimates and standard errors
on some or all of the explanatory variables incorrect. In order to gain insight into the extent to
which this problem is present, we estimated equation (4) replacing the contemporary values of per
capita income and winning percentage with a one year lag of these variables. These values are
predetermined at the time the unobservable equation error term is realized. By deﬁnition these
values are uncorrelated with the equation error terms at time t. An alternative correction would
be to use the Instrumental Variables estimator. However, we do not have good instruments for
these variables in our current data, leaving lagged values as the best available alternative. Table 3
contains the results of this estimation.
The results on Table 3 are similar to those on Table 2, with several important diﬀerences. The
parameter on the winning percentage variable is markedly smaller for MLB when the lagged value
is used - the elasticity of average attendance with respect to changes in winning percentage at the
mean in MLB is about 0.70, compared to an elasticity of about 1 in the previous speciﬁcation -
suggesting that some bias might be present in the results on Table 2. Similarly, the parameters
on the per capita income variable are both larger in MLB. The statistical signiﬁcance of the team
trend variable changes in both MLB and the NFL. In the NFL, the team trend variable is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 6% and 7% level, providing weak evidence of a positive fan loyalty eﬀect in
the NFL. There is also stronger evidence of a persistent novelty eﬀect in the NFL of Table 3, as
the dummy variables on seasons two, three, ﬁve and seven are positive and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level.
The sizes of the signiﬁcant novelty eﬀect parameters shown on Table 3 diﬀer considerably
across sports. The results indicate that the novelty eﬀect declines over time in MLB. For example,
relative to average attendance, the ﬁrst year a stadium is open attendance is about 24% larger than
otherwise but in the seventh season the boost over the average attendance is just over 10%. In the
NBA, the increase in attendance implied by the signiﬁcant parameters is about 10% over average
for the ﬁrst nine seasons. In the NFL, the increase is never more than 1% above annual average
attendance. In terms of number of additional tickets sold, and remembering that the estimates are
12Table 3: Attendance Model - Wins and Income Endogenous
Dependent Variable: Average Attendance
MLB NFL NBA
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Per Capita Income 1.248 1.210 0.722 0.695 -0.121 -0.131
0.000 0.000 0.087 0.099 0.316 0.282
Population 0.0003 0.00006 0.001 0.001 -0.0002 -0.0002
0.675 0.939 0.596 0.544 0.368 0.279
Current Winning % 32694 33850 16053 16532 7848 7863
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00
Stadium Age -182 -116 -148 -139 -80 -765




Team Trend 120 114 443 422 -90 -92




# Other Franchises -2027 -1833 -715 39 -0.607 12
0.000 0.001 0.443 0.967 0.998 0.952
Playoﬀs−1 2845 2822 -48 -765 -286 -289
0.000 0.000 0.959 0.412 0.231 0.228
First 10 Years 2445 2526 1042
0.003 0.003 0.000
First Year 6668 3037 1263
0.000 0.085 0.012
Second Year 5076 4093 1253
0.001 0.017 0.002
Third Year 4384 3487 1162
0.003 0.053 0.004
Fourth Year 3388 2131 1424
0.015 0.229 0.001
Fifth Year 3660 4589 1451
0.009 0.007 0.000
Sixth Year 2784 1808 849
0.040 0.293 0.038
Seventh Year 2591 5223 767
0.053 0.002 0.062
Eighth Year 3075 650 690
0.020 0.707 0.098
Ninth Year 1260 3004 877
0.327 0.086 0.040
Tenth Year 1704 -900 1166
0.177 0.598 0.007
Observations 780 780 891 891 736 736
R
2 0.73 0.74 0.50 0.51 0.78 0.77
P-values Shown Below Parameters
13lower bounds, the results on Table 3 imply that a baseball team with a new stadium would sell an
additional 2,561,702 tickets in the ﬁrst eight seasons in the new ballpark, a basketball team would
sell 446,936 over the ﬁrst nine seasons in a new arena, and a football team would sell an additional
163,436 over the ﬁrst ﬁve seasons in a new stadium.
In sum, we interpret the results on Table 3 as indicating the possibility of endogeneity problems,
in the form of correlation between contemporaneous values of per capita income and winning
percentage and the equation error term, aﬀecting the results shown on Table 2. After correcting for
possible endogeneity by lagging the winning percentage and real per capita income variables, we
ﬁnd strong evidence of a novelty eﬀect of new sports facilities on average attendance in MLB and
the NBA and somewhat weaker evidence in the NFL. In the following investigation of the dynamics
of the novelty eﬀect of new facilities on attendance, we use the empirical model with lagged values
of these variables.
A. The Dynamics of the Novelty Eﬀect
The results in the previous section suggest that the presence of a new facility provides a persistent
and signiﬁcant boost to average attendance in the NFL, NBA and MLB. The persistence and size
of this novelty eﬀect appears to vary across sports. Because of the potentially complex dynamics of
this eﬀect, and because this relatively crude dummy variable approach used in the previous section
may not capture rich dynamic behavior, we further explore the relationship between new facilities
and attendance using the patterns of point estimates on the ck parameters in equation (4) for each
professional sport. These parameters reﬂect the dynamics of the novelty eﬀect of new facilities on
average attendance.
We ﬁrst perform F-tests on subsets of these parameters. We perform two types of F-tests. The
ﬁrst procedure iteratively increases K by one and tests the signiﬁcance of each additional variable.
This approach looks for evidence of a marginal novelty eﬀect in each additional season a franchise
plays in a new facility; holding constant the novelty eﬀect in prior seasons, does the novelty eﬀect
persist for an additional season. This is a relatively strict deﬁnition of a novelty eﬀect, as it holds
constant any previous impact on attendance.
The results of these F-tests are shown on the top panel of Table 4. Note that we report F-
statistics and the P-value for these F-statistics on the table. An alternative would be to report
t-statistics on each additional variable in this iterative procedure. In this setting, an F-test and a
t-test are computationally equivalent - the P-values are identical - but we report the F-statistics
because they were more convenient to calculate and report. The marginal novelty eﬀects persist in
seasons one through three, and reappear in seasons ﬁve and eight, in MLB. Like the results on Table
3, this suggests relatively persistent novelty eﬀects of new stadiums in baseball. As discussed above,
these parameters decline in size over time, suggesting that the marginal novelty eﬀect diminishes
with the passage of time in new baseball stadiums. There is relatively little evidence of important
marginal novelty eﬀects in both the NFL and the NBA. In the NFL, a marginal novelty eﬀect
appears only in seasons ﬁve and seven following the opening of a new stadium, and in the NBA
a marginal novelty eﬀect appears in only seasons ﬁve and ten, based on a 5% level of statistical
signiﬁcance. Under this stricter deﬁnition of novelty eﬀects, only MLB appears to experience the
eﬀect.
A less stringent deﬁnition of novelty eﬀects can be tested for in the same setting by examin-
ing the statistical signiﬁcance of sets of parameters. The individual coeﬃcients may not be well
identiﬁed because the variables indicating the number of years since opening are highly correlated.
Consequently, individual statistical signiﬁcance may not be found while the variables are jointly
signiﬁcant. A test for novelty eﬀects that addresses this weaker form of eﬀect iteratively increments
14Table 4: Novelty Eﬀects: F-Tests on ck Parameters
MLB NFL NBA
Null Hypothesis F-statistic P-value F-statistic P-value F-statistic P-value
c1 = 0 7.51 0.006 0.56 0.453 0.45 0.502
c2 = 0 5.20 0.023 1.94 0.164 0.77 0.379
c3 = 0 5.08 0.025 1.03 0.309 0.66 0.417
c4 = 0 2.88 0.090 0.09 0.768 3.45 0.064
c5 = 0 4.78 0.029 4.68 0.031 5.49 0.019
c6 = 0 2.76 0.097 0.24 0.622 0.81 0.368
c7 = 0 3.15 0.076 8.71 0.003 0.80 0.372
c8 = 0 5.97 0.015 0.05 0.820 0.67 0.413
c9 = 0 0.77 0.381 3.24 0.072 2.26 0.133
c10 = 0 1.42 0.233 0.28 0.598 7.20 0.007
c1 = c2 = 0 6.38 0.002 1.25 0.287 0.61 0.542
c1 = ... = c3 = 0 5.97 0.001 1.18 0.317 0.63 0.597
c1 = ... = c4 = 0 5.21 0.000 0.91 0.460 1.34 0.255
c1 = ... = c5 = 0 5.15 0.000 1.66 0.141 2.17 0.055
c1 = ... = c6 = 0 4.76 0.000 1.43 0.202 1.95 0.071
c1 = ... = c7 = 0 4.54 0.000 2.48 0.016 1.78 0.088
c1 = ... = c8 = 0 4.75 0.000 2.17 0.028 1.64 0.109
c1 = ... = c9 = 0 4.30 0.000 2.30 0.015 1.71 0.082
c1 = ... = c10 = 0 4.02 0.000 2.09 0.023 2.28 0.013
the parameter K in equation (4) and tests for the joint signiﬁcance of the parameters on all the
year dummy variables using an F-test.
The bottom panel of Table 4 shows the results of tests for an average novelty eﬀect of new
facilities on attendance. Again, evidence of an average novelty eﬀect appears in MLB, where the
null of a zero parameter on all of the added variables is rejected for each speciﬁcation. This would
be expected given the strong marginal novelty eﬀects in MLB. In the NFL, evidence of an average
novelty eﬀect does not appear until season seven, again suggesting that the novelty eﬀect is quite
weak in football. There is no evidence of important average novelty eﬀects in the NBA until season
10.
Recall that all of the parameters estimated from equation (4) are reduced form parameters in an
attendance model. We described above a feature that allows us to calculate a measure of the novelty
eﬀect that corrects for the scaling of the structural parameters by the factor s
s+d, where the j
are the price elasticities of supply and demand by using ratios of the reduced form parameters ck.
Since each ck parameter is scales the structural novelty eﬀect parameters γi in the same direction,
then the ratio of any two parameters will “wash out” the scaling. The statistical signiﬁcance of a
non-linear relationship between two or more parameters in a linear regression model can be tested
for using a Wald test and the test statistic has an F distribution asymptotically. See Greene (2000),
pages 438-439, provides details on this procedure. Table 5 shows the values of the parameter ratios,
the F-statistic for the null hypothesis that the parameter ratio is equal to zero, and the P-value
on the test statistic for the ten seasons following the opening of a new facility in each professional
sport.
The results for MLB are consistent with the results from previous tests. The novelty eﬀect
in MLB persists for eight seasons and declines steadily over the period. In the sixth season and
beyond, the novelty eﬀect is less than half the size it was in the ﬁrst season in a new ballpark.
15Table 5: Novelty Eﬀects: Parameter Ratios
MLB NFL NBA
Ratio Value Wald P-Value Value Wald P-Value Value Wald P-Value
c2
c1 0.761 10.00 0.002 1.35 2.43 0.119 1.00 4.95 0.026
c3
c1 0.658 8.07 0.005 1.15 2.09 0.149 0.93 4.83 0.028
c4
c1 0.508 6.17 0.013 0.70 1.18 0.278 1.14 5.39 0.021
c5
c1 0.549 6.74 0.010 1.51 2.53 0.112 1.17 5.50 0.019
c6
c1 0.417 4.40 0.036 0.60 0.95 0.330 0.67 3.24 0.072
c7
c1 0.389 3.89 0.049 1.72 2.54 0.111 0.60 2.74 0.098
c8
c1 0.461 5.07 0.025 0.21 0.14 0.706 0.53 2.18 0.140
c9
c1 0.189 1.02 0.314 0.99 1.70 0.193 0.69 2.88 0.090
c10
c1 0.256 1.86 0.173 -0.30 0.24 0.626 0.93 3.84 0.051
There is no evidence of important novelty eﬀects in football in the parameter ratios.
In the NBA the evidence from the parameter ratios shows strong evidence of a novelty eﬀect
of new arenas on attendance at professional basketball games through the ﬁrst ﬁve seasons in a
new facility, with the eﬀect strengthening in seasons four and ﬁve. This evidence diﬀers from the
F-tests, which showed only weak evidence of novelty eﬀects in the NBA and can be accounted for
by the added structure the ratios imply for the model. There is no evidence of a novelty eﬀect on
average attendance in the NFL based on the Wald test statistics on the parameter ratios.
V. Policy Implications
A large majority of new sports facilities in the U.S. are paid for entirely or mostly by public funds.
In the past 10 years only Pac Bell Park, the new home of the San Francisco Giants, and the MCI
Center, the new home of the Washington Wizards, were paid for using private funds. Despite the
repeated claims to the contrary by proponents of public subsidies for professional sports facilities,
there is no evidence that professional sports teams or franchises have a positive economic impact
on the surrounding communities, and some evidence suggests that they have a detrimental eﬀect.
Our results show that average attendance at professional sporting events, especially MLB,
increases as a direct result of the construction of a new stadium or arena in a city. Because ticket
sales are an important source of revenues for professional sports franchises, most of the incremental
economic beneﬁts generated by new sports facilities appear to be captured by the franchises. This
has important public policy implications.
The increased attendance provides an easily identiﬁable target for user fees to oﬀset the public
subsidization for the construction of new sports facilities. In the cases of baseball and basketball,
such user fees could be collected over the period of increased attendance due to the novelty eﬀect.
To the extent that the novelty eﬀect reﬂects visitors from outside the city who are attracted by the
new facility, these user fees represent new sources of revenue to the local government, and may be
substantially “exported” to other jurisdictions.
New stadium and arena construction projects are often ﬁnanced through the sale of bonds.
These bonds typically have a maturity period of twenty or more years. Our results suggest that the
novelty impact of new facilities on average attendance occurs over a much shorter period of time,
as little as four to ten seasons. Financing a new facility over two or three decades that increases
attendance for only ﬁve to ten years makes little sense in economic terms unless revenues from the
16years of boosted attendance exceed in present value terms the ﬁnancing costs, and those revenues
are banked to cover those future costs. Given the relatively short duration of the novelty eﬀect on
attendance, alternative ﬁnancing methods should be explored in the future.
VI. Conclusions
Building a new stadium or arena increases average attendance at professional sporting events held
in these new facilities. The evidence in this paper suggests that this eﬀect is strongest, and most
persistent, in Major League Baseball, somewhat smaller and less persistent in the National Basket-
ball Association, and relatively weak and short lived in the National Football League. The novelty
eﬀect of a new facility appears to persist as long as seven or eight seasons in MLB and the NBA.
In MLB, the novelty eﬀect diminishes slowly and steadily over time but in the NBA it remains
steady before disappearing abruptly. A small but signiﬁcant increase in attendance in the NFL can
be detected over the ﬁrst ten seasons, but the dynamics of the novelty eﬀect in the NFL do not
appear to be strong.
The importance of the novelty eﬀect, and the complex dynamic behavior of this eﬀect, found in
our research diﬀers considerably from the way that the eﬀect of new sports facilities were treated
in prior research. Up until now, researchers assumed that the eﬀects of a new sports facility were
distributed equally over a period of between three and eleven years following the opening of the
new facility and that the eﬀect was equal in all seasons in all sports. Our results indicate a richer,
more complicated dynamic environment. The novelty eﬀect of new facilities diﬀers in size and
persistence across the three sports. In general it does not last as long as was assumed in previous
research.
Our results have important implications for public policy and future research. Novelty eﬀects on
attendance imply that future public subsidies for new sports facility construction could be partially
oﬀset by user fees levied on attendees. This would be a signiﬁcant change in the public ﬁnancing of
sports facility construction. The short duration of the novelty eﬀect calls into question the practice
of ﬁnancing new sports facility construction with bonds that are paid oﬀ over long periods of time.
Future public subsidies should be ﬁnanced over shorter periods of time to match the estimated
duration of the novelty eﬀect or surpluses from early years held to meet future obligations.
Our results raise several interesting issues to be addressed in future research. Why does the
novelty eﬀect vary across sports? Does the typical baseball fan diﬀer in important ways from the
typical football fan or basketball fan? What role do local and national broadcasts of sporting events
play in the eﬀect of a new facility on attendance? Finally, we ﬁnd mixed evidence about the eﬀect
of fan loyalty, as measured by the number of years a franchise has been in a particular city, on
average attendance. This measure of fan loyalty is crude, and leaves considerable room for the
development of better measures of fan loyalty. The striking diﬀerences in the estimated eﬀect of
fan loyalty across sports also raises interesting questions about the nature of sports fans and the
consumption beneﬁts they derive from the presence of a local team to root for, as well as the nature
of consumer preferences.
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